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Abstract. We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and
show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority
guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can
extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold
is increasing in the extraction power.
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1. Introduction
Apart from being a naturally appealing rule to take collective decisions, the simple major-
ity rule has been shown to satisfy a set of desirable axioms on the largest class of preference
domains (Dasgupta and Maskin 2008). Moreover, supermajority rules have been shown to
guarantee the existence of a "stable" collective decision under mild restrictions on individual
and collective preferences (Caplin and Nalebu¤ 1988).
In this note we discuss a new, and previously unnoticed, property of majority rules that
applies when majority and minoritiesmembers can take actions that a¤ect each others wel-
fare. Such externalities in collective decisions imply that the expected payo¤s of a coalition
of agentsdepend on the behaviour of remaining agents in the system. This problem is well
known and extensively studied in the theory of coalitional games with externalities (Bloch
1996, Ray and Vohra 1997,Yi 1997, Maskin 2003, Ray 2007, Hafalir 2007). In particular,
core allocations fail to exist even when the game possess strong aggregative properties, such
as a notion of convexity accounting for externalities (Hafalir 2007), both when the players
in complementary coalitions are assumed to stick together (delta core or core with merging
expectations) or when they organize optimally to maximize their own payo¤s (rational ex-
pectations core). In this note we show that in all symmetric games with externalities that
satisfy certain regularity conditions, restricting the blocking power to majority coalitions
guarantees that the core is nonempty for all expectations on playersbehaviour. Moreover,
we show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, then stability requires to
limit the deviation power to supermajorities, and that the required size increases with the
extraction power.
2. Setup and Notation
2.1. The Strategic Form Game. Let G = (N; (X; ui)i2N) be a game in strategic form,
with nite set playersN = f1; 2; :::; ng, strategy setXi and payo¤function ui : X1::Xn !
R+ for each i 2 N . We assume that G is symmetric and monotone in the following sense:
A.1(Symmetry). Xi = X for all i 2 N . Moreover, for all x 2 Xn and all permutations
p : N ! N : up(i)
 
xp(1); :::; xp(n)

= ui (x1; :::; xn).
A.2 (Monotone Externalities). One of the following two cases must hold:
(1) Positive Externalities (PE): ui(x) increasing in xNnfig for all i and all x 2 Xn;
(2) Negative Externalities (NE): ui(x) decreasing in xNnfig for all i and all x 2 Xn.
2.2. Coalitions and Coalitional Worth. A partition  = (S1; S2; ::; Sj; ::; Sm) of N de-
scribes the cooperation patterns in the game G. Let sj denote the cardinality of Sj for all
j = 1; 2; ::m. Players belonging to the same coalition in  are assumed to cooperate to
achieve their maximal joint payo¤. Across coalitions agents set strategies non-cooperatively.
Formally, for each partition  = (S1; S2; :::; Sj; :::; Sm) we dene the game G() with player
set f1; 2; :::j; ::;mg, each with strategy set Xj = XSj and payo¤ function Uj =
P
i2Sj ui.
Note that the way in which we dene the game G() implies that our symmetry assumption
holds both within and across coalitions in G() (compare with the weaker assumption used
by Yi 1997).
Under suitable assumptions on payo¤ functions, reaction functions in G() are such that
all members within a coalition play the same strategy (see Currarini and Marini 2006).
When G() possesses a unique Nash Equilibrium, equilibrium payo¤s unambiguously dene
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coalitional worths in . Note that in the present setting, the partition formed by the grand
coalition N always generates the maximal aggregate payo¤, and is, in this sense, e¢ cient.
2.3. Core Stability. We will be interested in e¢ cient outcomes of the game G that are
stable against objection by subcoalitions of the set N . Because of the presence of exter-
nalities, what a coalition expects to obtain by objecting to a proposed allocation crucially
depends on what partition it expects to emerge in response to the objection. Let us denote
by (S) such expected partition, for all S  N . Specic cases include the gamma expecta-
tion, where players in NnS split up into singletons, the delta expectation, where remaining
players merge into the coalition NnS, and the rational expectation, where remaining players
are expected to re-organize in the partition of the set NnS that guarantees them the highest
aggregate payo¤. Given (S), a characteristic function v(S) is obtained for each coalition S
by considering the Nash equilibrium payo¤ of S in the game G((S)).
Denition 1 The core of the characteristic function game (N; v) consists of all e¢ cient
allocations u 2 Rn+ such that
P
i2S ui  v(S) for all S  N .
The core concept allows all possible coalitions to object. In this paper we impose a constraint
coming from the cardinality of coalitions, and in particular the case in which only coalitions
with at least a given percentage beta of all players are allowed to object to proposed e¢ cient
allocations. Formally, we will denote by M(N) the set of all subsets of N that include
strictly more than a given percentage  of the players in N . When  = 50% this reduces to
the simple majority rule and, for brevity, we will use the notationM(N); when  > 50% we
will use the term supermajority.
Denition 2 TheM-core of the characteristic function game (N; v) consists of all e¢ cient
allocations u 2 Rn+ such that
P
i2S ui  v(S) for all S  N such that s >   n.
3. Majorities and Core Stability
We start by recording an important property of the class of games considered here, that was
proved in Currarini and Marini (2006). We denote by uS the per capita payo¤ for members
of coalition S, that is, uS = US=s.
Let us also denote by es the unit vector of dimension s. For each Sj 2 , let us denote
as xj(x1; :; xj 1; xj+1; :; xm)esj the e¢ cient strategy prole played by the members of Sj
given the strategy proles (x1; :::; xj 1; xj+1; :::; xm) played by the other coalitions in . For
brevity, we denote by xj(xk) the e¢ cient choice of members of Sj as a function of the choice
of members of Sk, keeping all other strategies xed.
Denition 3 The game G() satises the "contraction property" if for each two coalitions
Sj; Sk 2  such that sj = sk, the function xj(xk) is a contraction.
Lemma 1. Let G be a symmetric monotonic game. Let also G have either strategic com-
plements or strategic substitutes and the contraction property. For all partition  and coali-
tions S; T in  such that t < s, the Nash equilibrium x() of the game G() satises
uS(x()) < uT (x()).
Under the gamma expectation, Lemma 1 immediately implies that the e¢ cient equal-split
allocation in G belongs to the core of (N; v). In fact, any objecting coalition S would face
smaller coalitions in the induced partition (S), whose members are better of than the
members of S by Lemma 1, contradicting e¢ ciency of the equal split allocation in the rst
place. The same argument does not apply, however, to minority coalitions under the delta
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expectation, who face a larger coalition in the induced partition (S). The core under the
delta expectation may in fact be empty even under the assumptions of Lemma 1.
By ruling out the formation of objecting minorities, the simple majority rule generates
conditions under which the argument above applies for all types of expectations. In fact,
the formation of a majority S is necessarily followed by the formation of smaller coalitions,
independently of the particular expectation (S), and the existence of protable deviations
would, again, contradict the e¢ ciency of the equal split allocation.
Proposition 1. Let G be a symmetric monotonic game. Let also G have either strategic
complements or strategic substitutes and the contraction property. Then, theM-core of the
game G is nonempty for all expectations (S).
3.1. Exploitation of Minorities and Supermajority Rules. As dened above, the
worth of a majority S is fully determined by the actions of its members and by the ex-
ternal e¤ects of the actions taken by the other players in N . Majorities have, in this sense,
no coercive power over minorities. This makes the analysis of the previous section somewhat
unt to describe political or voting processes and their stability.
If majorities could extract resources from minorities, the argument of Lemma 1 would not, by
itself, guarantee non emptiness of the core. The strategic disadvantage of majorities (as es-
tablished in Lemma 1) would be counteracted by their extraction power which, if too strong,
may undermine stability. In what follows we provide a simple su¢ cient condition under
which supermajority rules can restore core-stability under the delta expectation even in the
case of minoritiesexploitation. A straightforward argument shows that this immediately
implies core-stability under all possible expectations. This condition essentially strengthens
the property established in Lemma 1 by requiring that the strategic disadvantage of majori-
ties - net of any minority exploitation - increases with their relative size. As we show in
section 4, this property is satised in several well-known games in which coalition formation
and cooperation are a relevant issue.
Let us rst dene
(3.1) (S)  uNnS(x((S))  uS(x((S))
the di¤erence in per capita payo¤s between the coalitions NnS and S in the partition (S) =
fS;NnSg at the Nash equilibrium associated to (S). By Lemma 1, (S) > 0 for S > NnS.
A3: The di¤erence (S) is increasing in s for all s = n
2
.
Consider now the characteristic function v(S) obtained from the game G under the delta
expectation. We can dened a modied function v(S) that encompasses the extraction of an
arbitrary majority coalition S of a per capita worth of z from each member of the minority
coalition NnS. The di¤erence between the per-capita payo¤s of a majority coalition S and
its complement becomes:
(S)  uNnS(x((S))  z   uS(x((S))  z (n  s)
s
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions A1, A2 and A3 hold. Let z denote the per-capita worth
that majorities can extract from minorities. Then, for each z < (Nnfig)n 1
n
, there exists
1 >  > 1
2
such that theM-core is nonempty. Moreover,  is increasing in z.
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Proof. The expression (S) can be written as follows:
(S) = (S)  z(n
s
)
which under A.3 is increasing in s for all s = n
2
. This, together with the assumption that
z < (Nnfig)n 1
n
(a bound on the extraction power) guarantees that there exists some given
size s < n after which (S) > 0. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 apply again for all coalitions
of size larger than s. 
4. Examples
In this nal section we present three well-know examples of games falling in the present
framework and for which assumption A.3. holds. For these games the size of supermajority
required for stability as a function of extraction power can be easily computed.
4.1. Oligopoly Games. In an oligopoly game with identical rms and no synergies each
merger (or cartel) behaves as a macro-player (i.e. as a single rm). Therefore, in the
partition (S) = fS; Tg equilibrium prots are such that UNnS(x((S)) = US(x((S)).
This implies that (S) is strictly increasing in s for s  n=2 and, therefore, Proposition 2
applies. The level of required supermajority increases monotonically with the intensity of
minority exploitation. For instance, under linear Cournot oligopoly and normalized demand
and cost such that (a  c)2 = 1, for n = 10 if the extraction power is z = 0:0055 the required
supermajority is s = 6, while if z = 0:088, s = 9. Similar results can be obtained in all
games in which, as in Cournot, coalitional worths in G() are independent on coalitional
sizes.
4.2. Public Good Games. Ray & Vohra 1997 consider a game of public goods contribution
in which each agent i 2 N contributes xi and receives a payo¤ Ui(x) =
P
j2N xj   cx2i . The
worth of coalition S is US(x) = s
P
j2N xj  
P
i2S cx
2
i . Computing the equilibrium prole
x((S)) we obtain:
(S) =
2s2 + (n  s)2
4c
  s
2 + 2(n  s)2
4c
=
(2s  n)n
4c
;
which is positive and monotonically increasing in s for s > n
2
. Therefore, A.3 holds and
Proposition 2 applies. Note that similar results are obtained in all games for which the
function US(x((S)) increases more tham proportionally for s 2

0; n
2

and less than pro-
portionally for s 2  n
2
; n

:
4.3. Alliances in Contests. Following a number of recent contributions on alliance forma-
tion in contests (see, for instance, Bloch 2011 for a survey), let n players exert e¤ort ei 2 Ei
and obtain a payo¤ ui : En ! R+ given by
ui(e) = p(e)R  c(ei)
where R is a xed prize obtained by competing, c(ei) player is cost of e¤ort, and(
p(e) = ei
 P
i2Nei
 1
if
P
i2Nei > 0
and 1jN j otherwise
is a contest-success function typical of rent-seeking games (Tullock 1987). The e¤ort of each
player a¤ects her probability to access prize (here xed for simplicity).
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When only two coalitions S and T compete for prize, it can be shown that Lemma 1 applies.
Moroever, numerical simulations show that, with quadratic costs equal to c(ei) =
e2i
2
(s) =
P
i2NnS

ei
P
i2Nei
 1  e2i
2

n s  
P
i2S

ei
P
i2Nei
 1  e2i
2

s
is increasing in s and the required supermajority increases monotonically with the extraction
power. For instance, for n = 10,
s = 6 for z = 0:00618
s = 7 for z = 0:01589
s = 8 for z = 0:03328
s = 9 for z = 0:07497:
5. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that in symmetric games with no synergies the simple majority rule restricts
coalitionsblocking power so to guarantee the existence of core-stable allocations. We have
also argued that supermajorities may be required to ensure stability when majorities possess
exploitation rights over minorities.
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